题目
单项选择题
Assume that F1 and F2 can produce an identical product at a cost of 50 cents per unit. Each firm can produce only one unit and there is no collusion. The market consists of two buyers that consume one unit each and are willing to pay $1 for the product. What is the total value created and price?
选项
A.Value created = $1, Price = $1
B.Value Created = $1, Price = 50 cents
C.Value created = 50 cents, Price = $1
D.Value created = 50 cents, Price = 50 cents
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标准答案
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思路分析
Question restatement: Two firms (F1 and F2) can each produce one unit at cost 0.50 per unit. There are two buyers, each willing to pay 1.00 for the product. With no collusion, what is the total value created and the price?
Option analysis:
- Option A: 'Value Created = 50 cents, Price = $1' — This would imply a very small total value created, and the price is set at the full willingness-to-pay. Since two units can be produced, the total value created (sum of buyers’ valuations minus production costs) should reflect the two units sold. If......Login to view full explanation登录即可查看完整答案
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